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COMMENTARY
E N D I N G
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I N C A R C E R A T I O N

Ending Mass Incarceration
Some Observations and Responses to Professor Tonry
Gerard E. Lynch
Columbia University
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

W

e should all be grateful for Michael Tonry’s (2014, this issue) characteristically
thoughtful article proposing 10 concrete steps to reduce the excessive reliance
on incarceration in the United States. It would behoove legislatures and judges
to think carefully about each of his proposals. The following remarks constitute an attempt
to expand on some of his observations and offer a few cautionary notes about some of his
proposals.
At the outset, however, it is important to note that I fully agree with the general premise
of Tonry’s (2014) article, which is by now conventional wisdom among criminal law scholars
and practitioners and, increasingly, as Tonry is at pains to document, even among politicians
on both the right and the left of the American spectrum: The United States has a vastly
overinflated system of incarceration that is excessively punitive, disproportionate in its
impact on the poor and minorities, exceedingly expensive, and largely irrelevant to reducing
predatory crime. Tonry is also correct that the public mood seems to have shifted at least
to the extent that fear of crime no longer drives the political debate as it has for so long in
the United States. Reductions in imprisonment, in particular, and a movement away from
harshly punitive attitudes in general, are no longer politically unthinkable for candidates
for public office, as they have been since the late 1960s. As Tonry emphasizes, it might be
an opportune time to consider specific proposals to implement this revived willingness to
think about crime in a less fearful and vindictive manner.
Accordingly, Tonry (2014) focuses in large part on the practical mechanisms of reform.
That is, he asks what concrete legislative steps are called for to accomplish the desired
reduction in prison populations. That said, however, it is worth noting that Tonry recognizes
that the optimism about political will that informs the beginning of the piece might be
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overstated. The section “Moving Forward” in particular recognizes that the political will to
serious reform does not necessarily exist, as reflected by the fact that we are still doing little,
in most states and in the federal system, to reduce the number of people in prison. I also note
that the proposals in the section “Unwinding Mass Incarceration” are more ambitious, and
are of a different nature, than those in the section “Sentencing Laws for the Future.” Tonry’s
proposals in the first section could be considered, in one sense, to be mechanical—although
they are still difficult to accomplish politically. That is, they are presented as a technical
means of accomplishing progress toward an assumed goal of reducing incarceration. But
the proposals in the “Unwinding Mass Incarceration” section are not so much means
as ends: Tonry calls for the states to adopt specific goals for reducing incarceration over
time. I think his choice to include these proposals demonstrates an implicit recognition
that whatever consensus is beginning to develop around the abstract proposition that
“we have too many people in prison,” this still-nascent consensus has not evolved into a
concrete acceptance of any specific goal or target for reducing prison populations. Moreover,
the proposals in the “Unwinding Mass Incarceration” section are more radical insofar as
they suggest not merely a revision of criminal sentencing law on a prospective basis (which
would be welcome but would reduce the prison population only gradually) but also the
release of people currently in prison, in substantial numbers. Such proposals test whether
we are really serious: They translate “we have too many people in prison” into something
much more concrete. Reaching an agreement on these proposals would be a major political
advance; if we had a genuine political consensus that prison populations need to be reduced
in significant numbers, including the release of many persons now in prison, many of the
changes in the mechanics of sentencing set forth by Tonry would become no-brainers.
Moreover, some suggestions made by Tonry (2014) regarding sentencing law will not
necessarily have any effect on reducing incarceration, absent a genuine determination,
backed by enforceable legislative goals, to reduced prison populations. One of my few
substantive concerns about one of Tonry’s specific proposals illustrates this point. He
proposes that all states create sentencing commissions and adopt sentencing guidelines. I
agree with him—I played a role in persuading the American Law Institute (ALI) to start
its sentencing project to replace the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code, and
the impetus behind that change was in large part to promote guideline sentencing (and the
model legislation that has slowly taken shape within the ALI reflects that policy preference).
So I am on board with the general proposition. I understand that the experience in several
states (North Carolina and Minnesota come to mind) is that guidelines can be a factor in
reducing incarceration. I appreciate that the federal experience with guidelines is aberrational
in many ways. However, the federal example is a significant cautionary tale. Commission
and guidelines systems have many advantages, especially with respect to predictability and
equity in sentencing. But guidelines and commissions do not inherently lead to reducing
(or increasing) prison populations: That depends on the substance of the guidelines. In
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the federal system, harsh mandatory guidelines were a significant factor in dramatically
increasing sentence lengths.
There are many reasons for the increase in sentence lengths and many reasons to think
that, in state systems (particularly ones with elected judges), standardizing sentences can be
expected to decrease sentence lengths rather than increase them. But the federal experience
suggests a few points about guideline systems. First, guidelines will reduce incarceration
only when there is a political will to reduce sentences; otherwise, they probably will not. In
North Carolina, the adoption of a commission and guidelines was specifically intended to
reduce prison terms for nonviolent crimes without the legislature having to take the heat
for any specific reductions in sentences that might be considered “soft on crime.” But the
legislature wanted to reduce prison budgets and recognized a commission-driven reduction
in property-crime sentences as a desirable goal. The resulting reduction in overincarceration
was not a product of guidelines in themselves but of the political will that lay behind
the adoption of the guideline system. Some of what Tonry (2014) writes about guidelines
reflects the kind of optimism that Marvin Frankel (1973) brought to his original proposal
for sentencing guidelines—optimism that at least in the federal system proved misplaced.
Judge Frankel believed that because creating guidelines was much too complicated a task
for politicians to undertake for themselves and enact into legislation, having a commission
would ensure that the guidelines process would be in the hands of politically insulated
experts. He was right that creating guidelines was a daunting task. But if creating guidelines
was too difficult for Congress, messing with them once a system had been created was not.
Once a system is created, it is not complicated for a legislature to direct that the guideline
sentence for a given crime be increased, and even if the general political climate is less driven
by bitterness about rising crime rates, there will always be a temptation, driven by news
reports of spectacular crimes, to react by tightening the screws. If the political actors want
increased toughness, then I do not think that guidelines can exert any much counterpressure;
they can even be a facilitating factor in increasing incarceration.
Second, Tonry (2014) repeats the view, which is common among guideline proponents,
that voluntary guidelines do not work. But the term “voluntary” can be misleading. A wide
spectrum of de jure and de facto systems of guidelines exists between the purely hortatory
(I think that the view that “voluntary” guidelines are ineffective address such entirely advisory
system) and the effectively mandatory and inflexible/like the federal guidelines, although
even they were not, as a matter of law, mandatory, because they permitted (narrowly circumscribed) departures in the discretion of sentencing judges. Tonry supports “presumptive”
guidelines. I think that is the right rubric, but in practice a great deal depends on the
strength of the presumption. Both the current federal “advisory” guideline system and the
former putatively “mandatory” guideline system could be described as involving presumptive guideline sentencing, although the systems are widely perceived as very different from
each other.
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Third, part of the problem with the federal guidelines is that they operated as a substitute
for penal code reform. Unlike most (especially Model Penal Code–based) state codes, which
already contain degrees of offenses and typically cover a relatively discrete type of conduct
under each statutory heading, the federal guidelines had to create a sentencing scheme for
offenses that had no coherent core. This technical fact about the federal guidelines raises
the general point that substantive penal law is important. One reason we have too many
people in jail is that we have too-long sentences for conduct that is appropriately made
criminal, but another is that we overuse the criminal sanction for conduct that need not be
dealt with by the criminal law at all. That might be a topic beyond Tonry’s (2014) scope,
but it is an important one for us to consider. The “war on drugs” is just one example of a
policy whose reliance not just on long prison terms, but on the criminal law itself, warrants
reconsideration. Such reconsideration need not involve a debate about legalizing conduct
that is now illegal, but noncriminal sanctions and nonpunitive responses to a variety of
social problems with targeted use of criminal punishment for only the most severe aspects
of the conduct we aim to control might be both cost-effective and liberty enhancing.
Moreover, measures to reduce sentences, or even to cut back on the content of penal
codes, ignore a large part of our custodial population. A significant portion of our carceral
population is not in prisons (institutions for punishing offenders convicted of serious
offenses and sentenced to long terms in custody) but in jails (local institutions for detaining
those accused of crime or sentenced to short terms). Tonry (2014) does little to address this
facet of the problem. Repetitive short terms in jail for petty offenses or the jailing of persons
to await trial on charges that are eventually dropped deprive many people of liberty, often
for a surprisingly long time. Many of these people do not need to be imprisoned and (like
many of our prison inmates) are in custody as a practical matter because they are mentally
ill, or otherwise disruptive of their communities. Finding alternative ways to deal with these
individuals, and reduce our jail population, is an important project.
The reminder that many of the inhabitants of our prisons and jails are mentally ill
leads me to another point, which I am afraid is a pessimistic one. Reformers are prone to
overpromise about the benefits to be expected from the reforms they propose. I fully agree
that we spend too much on prisons and that the belief that mass incarceration is necessary
to control crime is exaggerated. It should follow that we can reduce the size and cost of our
prisons without unacceptable increases in crime. But caution is in order, on both the cost
and crime fronts.
Tonry (2014) points to the dollar costs of our overuse of imprisonment and argues, like
many reformers, that providing other social services would be cheaper. That might be true.
But I think it is a mistake to sell reduced incarceration primarily as an economy measure—
especially if we are arguing that our streets can be safe without incarceration. A substantial
part of our prison and jail population exists as a result of the deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill. That process was also sold on the ground that it would be both economical
and liberty enhancing to treat the mentally ill in the community. Well, it turned out to
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be cheaper mostly because the social services that were supposed to be provided in the
community were not in fact provided. But that led to the reinstitutionalization of many
troubled and troubling people via the criminal justice system. Turning a lot of people
out of jail without services (which is the predictable result of a policy of “reduce prison
populations and save a lot of bucks”) risks bad consequences on the street. I think we need
to be clear that our problem is using prisons to deal with social problems and that reducing
our use of prisons will not do much to solve those social problems. No doubt a reduction in
incarceration could do some good in that regard: Avoiding family disruption and reducing
structural unemployment of ex-prisoners would be useful, and prisons are criminogenic in
some ways. But we are fooling ourselves, possibly in dangerous ways or in ways that risk
a return to public fear and restoration of the prison regime, if we do nothing with the
money saved but reduce taxes or deficits. Many of those who do not belong in prisons do
need treatment through mental health services, probationary oversight, and the like. Freeing
prisoners without any social oversight is costly, but the necessary treatment and supervision
is costly. Efforts to save money by farming probationary and treatment services out to the
private sector is not likely to work, either—we are already beginning to observe evidence
of the abuses that result when alternatives to incarceration are managed for private profit.
Ignoring the social pathologies that lead young men to think that violence, theft, or the
drug trade are the only available routes to income, social status, and self-respect will leave
us with the same depressing crime problem we turned to prisons, ineffectively, to solve.
Attempting to treat those pathologies will easily eat up whatever we save in prison budgets.
Finally, I would say one other word of caution. I am a little more hesitant than Tonry
(2014) about the idea that our experiment in mass incarceration had nothing to do with
recent reductions in crime. That seems to be the conventional wisdom among criminologists,
but there is a tendency to oversimplify the point. I understand and applaud the fact that
New York, for example, has managed to reduce prison populations while reducing serious
crime. That is the key takeaway on which I fully agree with Tonry: We can be smarter
about our use of incarceration without sacrificing public safety. But it remains true that if
you lock up everybody who has committed a crime, you will (at great and excessive cost
to liberty and the public fisc) be locking up a lot of people who are indeed dangerous and
who might not be accurately identified by more selective means of incapacitation. I do
not argue that the possibility that overinclusive imprisonment might reduce crime rates at
the margins is worth the cost of imprisoning huge numbers of people who pose little or
no threat and whose incarceration brings misery to themselves, their families, and their
communities. But I am wary of implicitly overpromising. There is some controversy in
the literature about the effectiveness of longer periods of incarceration in reducing crime.
I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to argue the point; I do not have an opinion about
the relative role of various factors in reducing crime rates generally in the United States
and especially steeply in a few cities (most notably New York). Perhaps it is just my tragic
worldview that leads me to assume generally that we cannot always have it all and to be
Volume 13 r Issue 4

565

Commentary

Ending Mass Incarceration

skeptical of the argument that having a humane carceral policy will have no cost at all in
terms of crime rates. Perhaps Tonry completely disagrees, and he knows much more than I
do about the relevant criminological studies. But to the extent that there is any nuance in his
views or any controversy in the literature, I would like it to be acknowledged more explicitly.
There is a difference between arguing that we are insanely overdoing imprisonment to no
good effect and failing to recognize the risks in indiscriminate reductions in incarceration
that mirror the harm caused by the indiscriminate increases of the last generation.
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